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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

SHERI\fAN V. LUND,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

~fOUNTAIN
CO~IPANY,

Case No. 9389

FUEL SUPPLY

Defendant and

App~ella1d.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
For the sake of brevity, reference to the record on
appeal will be designated in parentheses by the capital
letter "R", followed by the page number; reference to
the testimony or transcript 'vill be sho,vn by the capital
letter "T"; and reference to the exhibits 'vill be shown
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lowed by the exhibit number. The words "appellant" and
"defendant" will designate ~fountain Fual Supply Company, and the words "respondent" and '"plaintiff'' ,,Tjll
designate Sherman V. Lund.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, ~Iountain Fuel Supply Co1npany, is a
Utah corporation, engaged in the business of distributing
natural gas in certain areas in the State of Utah. In
the month of May 1958, the defendant was selling natural
gas to plaintiff at his home located at 71 East 6700 South
Street, City of Bountiful, Davis County, Utah. Such
gas was transported to this area by means of a 2-inch
gas main running east and west and located directly
across the street from plaintiff's home ( T 21). A 3/!
inch service or feeder line extended from this main line
in a northerly direction to plaintiff's house. Tllis line
was connected to the 1nain line by means of a riser or
nipple and a dresser coupling ( T :27) Def's. Ex. No. 1
is a fair representation of the aforementioned line and
tap (T 185).
In the latter part of ~lay 1958, plaintiff and his wife
noticed a wilting and discoloration of a part of their
lawn and foliage (7 57, 7:2). He asked his wife to call
the County Agent in regard to this and the Agent, in
response to her call, suggested she notify the defendant
( T51). On June 17, 1958, l\lrs. Lund called the defendant
and reported a possible leak (T72). The defendant responded immediately by dispatehing tw~·o employees, ~lr.
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.J(akin and .lllr. Clark, to investigate .lllrs. Lund's report
1S:2). In their inve~tigation ~1r. (jlark and ~Ir. ~lakin
discovered a break in the service tap near the rnain line
directly across the stree from plaintiff's residence ( rr
183). This break \Vas repaired immediately by Mr.
Clark and his rre\v (T 183). ~1r. ~lakin stated that the
rnain line and tap had been buried approximately three
feet deep, but that sorne people, in building a new home
directly across the street, had removed the soil frorn the
top of thi~ u1ain line and tap, leaving it approximately
16 inches below the surface ( T 24, 25, 39). He further
stated that the rnan who lived in the house directly across
the street from plaintiff told him that a dual-wheeled
cement truck became stuck directly over this tap (T 13).
The record shows that the tire tracks and indentation in
the earth were approximately 12 inches in depth and
within approxin1ately four inches of the main line (T
25). This pressure exerted on the service line by this
truck caused the nipple to break directly below the top
of the 90 degree elbo,v, thus causing natural gas to escape
into the surrounding soil (T 29) and subsequently into
the front yard of plaintiff's residence (T 195).

cr

STATE:.\II~NT

OF POINTS

POINT I
The trial court erred (a) in perrnitting the case to
go to the jury in the absence of any standard in evidence
by which the jury could determine \\~hether or not defendant's gas line was at a proper depth; (b) in permitting
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the jury to supply such lack of evidence by "view'' of
premises ; and (c) by refusing to grant defendant's
motions to dismiss based upon such lack of evidence.
POINT II
The trial court com1nitted prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. 6, which ,,,.as leading, suggestive, contrary to the evidence, and 'vithdrew from the jury's consideration the question of ",.hether defendant "\Yas nagligent, and the court enhanced this error by requiring
the jury to determine dan1ages irrespective of the findings upon other questions submitted.

ARGUMENT
POIKT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED (A) IN PERMITTING THE
CASE TO GO TO THE JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
STANDARD IN EVIDENCE BY \YHICH 'THE JURY COULD
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT'S GAS
LINE WAS AT A PROPER DEPTH; (B) IN PERMITTING
THE JURY TO SUPPLY SUCH LACK OF EVIDENCE BY
''VIEW" OF ·THE PREMISES; AND (C) BY REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED
UPON SUCH LACK OF EVIDENCE.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved to dis1niss on the grounds that the plaintiff
failed to prove that the defendant "\Yas negligent; that
there was no casual connection betw·een the plaintiffs
alleged injury and the defendant ~s act or failure to act,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
and that plaintiff failed to prove damages. The n1otion
"·as again rene,,·ed at the close of defendant's evidence
( T :2:27, 228). These Inotions were taken under adviseInent by the court and on November 29, 1960, after the
conclusion of the trial and prior to entering judg1.nent
therein, the motion \vas again renewed by the defendant
(T 2±7). In refusing to grant these motions and after
having ruled out the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
eourt stated:
~'The

other findings as to negligence in either
burying the pipe too shallow or leaving it at a
depth after change in the area gives me considerable trouble.
"I have thought about that since this trial. The
only standard \vhich is put in evidence is that the
usual pipeline is buried in three feet. This ended
up not to exceed nine inches from the top. In the
verbal testimony it could not be sustained. I believe, however, in view of the premises and in
view of the location and in view of the dug-up
pipe I think the jury could reason from that, that
this pipeline was too shallow. I recognize that this
may be a slight change from the designation i:o.
the doctor ease where you have a clear standard
for a company or a doctor. The pipeline being
such, in the explanation, I believe they could do
it.

"I'll leave it stand and see ho\v you gentleinen later
stand." (T 249)
In this the court recognized that the eviden(·e adduced at the trial \vas not sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict but stated that since the jury had viewed the
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pre1nises, the jury could reason that the pipeline was
too shallow and thus overruled the defendant's motion
to dismiss. In doing this, the trial court committed prejudicial error as a jur~· is not per1nitted to vie\v premises
for the purpose of supvlying evidence or to obtain ne\v
or additional evidence.
This court held, inter alia, in the case of Sorenson
v. D.&R.G. Railroad Company, 49 Utah 548, 164 Pac.
1020, that the purpose of a jury in viewing the pre1nises
was to enable theu1 to better understand and more fully
appreciate the evidence produced before them in open
court, and not for the purpose of taking independent testimoi'.y. See also Redd v. ..A. ir\Yay ~Iotor Coach Lines,
104 lJtah 9, 137 P.2d 37±; Portland-Seattle Auto Frieght
v. Jones, 15 W ash.2d 603, 131 P.2d 736.
As noted in the above excerpt, the trial court w·as of
the opinion that the jury could reason, after having ~een
the "dug-up pipe" in place, that it \Yas too shallo\v. In
ado:plJ1ng this theory, the court con1n1itted prejudicial
error as there \Ya8 no standard in evidence to guide the
jury in making ~ueh a deter1nination. ,,~ e subnrit that the
jury could not find that the defendant ~s gas lines \\Tere
too shallo\\T bl•eause it had no standard \vith \\~hich to
compare the depth of these lines. The fact that the line
\\Tas hit and broken is not evidence of negligence because
negligence cannot be a~su1ned fron1 an injury.
An analogous situation is found in 1nedical malpractice cases in \vhich this court has consistently held that
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evidence Inust be submitted showing that the act or
acts eotnplained of \\'Pl'P not in accordance '''ith accepted
standards of professional skill. In the case of Huggins
v. II icken, G lTtah :2d ~;);), 310 P.~d 5~3, this court stated:
Plaintiff contends that so long as there re1nains
some evidence, lay or otherwise, upon \\~hich a
finding of negligent'e could rest, the case should
go to thP jury. This is undoubtedly correct if the
facts testified to are such as to sho\v that the
medical standard of care shown by expert evidence was breached b:- defendant. Absence such
evidence, in a case involving complex post operative treatment, inferences based on mere lay
h.!lo\vledge should not be sub1nitted to a jury. As
this court said in Forrest v. Eason, 1953, Utah,
261 P.2d 178, 180: 'Giving the case to the jury
under such circumstances (when certain fluids
were injected into the veins by a naturopath)
'vith no sho\ving that use of the substances was
not in accordance with accepted standards of professional skill, * * * \vith no showing that any of
the substances \vere deleterious, allows the jury
to indulge in that t}lJe of speculation unpermitted by this or other courts generally' * * *' '.
H

See also Anderson v. Xixon, 104 Utah

~G2,

139 P.2d 216.

The same rule of law would apply in the instant
case, i.e., some evidence must sho\\~ that the defendant
permitted its gas lines to re1nain too close to the surface, thus violating an accepted standard. In the absence of such evidence, there is nothing upon \vhich a
jury can base its findings. It must have substantial
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evidence upon which to base a verdict and may not inject
inferences based on lay knowledge. The depth at ",.hich
a natural gas line is buried is not so common that laymen can say if it was proper or not. Such information
is peculiarly within the knowledge of men trained in
this type of endeavor. In some instances a certain depth
may be considered proper while in other instances it
may not. The only evidence in the record on this point
is the testimony of 1\Ir. J\Iakin in ,,~hich he stated that
the lines were installed at a depth of three feet and that
after the top cover had been removed they were approximately 16 inches below the surface ( T 25, 39). \\T e submit that this will not support a finding that defendant's
lines were permitted to remain too close to the surface.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMl\II'TTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 6, WHICH WAS
LEADING, SUGGESTIVE, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE,
AND WITHDREW FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERA'TION
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT, AND THE COURT ENHANCED THIS ERROR BY
REQUIRING THE JURY TO DETERl\IINE DAMAGES IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FINDINGS UPON OTHER QUESTIONS SUBMITTED.

Instruction No. 6 (R 58, 59. 60), to \\~hich counsel
for defendant objeet.ed strenuously (T 234, 277), reads
as follows:
"No. 6
The court desires to ascertain the extent the
plaintiff has been da1naged as a result of gas seepSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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age into his property as a result of a break
or leak in the line across the street referred to in
the evidence as having been repaired June 17,
1958. The measure of such loss equals the difference in the fair 1narket value of the house and lot
of the plaintiff i1nmediately before and immediately· after the injury and damage to his property
were inflicted but must not be less than the actual
value of plants destroyed pius those not totally
destroyed or damaged calculated by determining
the value of the plants before damage and their
value after the damage.
'~Answer

the following question if you can do so
in light of the evidence as you view it:
"1-A What is the total damage proven by a preponderance of the evidence to be proximately
caused by the seepage of gas in guestion ~
Answer: $1,800.00
"Explanation :
The parties have agreed that the gas that seeped
into the plaintiff's yard at the time in question
came fro1n a break or leak located generally where
the feeder line that serves the Lund property
connects to the main line. The court desires to
ascertain certain facts concerning the cause of
the break or leak. Therefore, you as jurors are
asked to answer certain questions set forth below,
if you are able to do so as you view the evidence :
"2-A Is it at least just as probable that one of
the proximate causes of the break or leak was the
passage of vehicles over the line in the vicinity
of the break or leak as it is that such alleged
event \vas not proximate cause of the break or
leak~
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Answer : Yes.
"2-B Do you find it proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant's main line and/or
feeder line to the Lund property was negligently
installed or permitted to remain too near the surface, thereby subjecting others to an unreasonable
risk that it would be broken and plant life damaged~

Answer: Yes
'~ 2-C

If you have answered question 2-B 'yes',
then answer this question if you can: If you answer question 2-B 'no', pass this question:
Was the negligence found in 2-B a proximate
cause of the break or leak complained of?
Answer :

Yes~,

The above instruction correctly states that the parties agreed that gas seeped into plaintiff's yard but incorrectly assumes that this seepage caused plaintiff any
damage. It was never sho\vn during the course of this
trial that the seepage of natural gas in to plaintiff's yard
was the cause of plaintiff's property damage. Plaintiff
assumed that it \Yas, but failed to offer any proof on
this point on \\Thich he had the affir1na tive burden. An
instruction \v·hich is gi Yen \Yi thout eYidence in the record
to justify it \\Till constitute error because by it the jury
is told, at least inferentially, that there is son1e competant evidence upon \\Thich it is based. Green\Yood v. Kier,
125 Colo. 333, 243 P .2d ±17. The test of the sufficiency
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of evidPnce to support an instruction \vas stated by this
court in the ease of Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah
~;>, 176 P.:Zd 111, in \\~hich the court said:
"}:viden(·e suffic-ient to support a finding upon a
particular issue is sufficient to support an instruetion upon such issue. See Randall's Instruction to Juries, Section 140."
It is subn1itted that there is no evidence in the record
to support a finding that plaintiff's property da1nage was
due to natural gas. In fact, the only evidence on this
matter \vas produced by the defendant's witness, }[r.
DeBell, a garden consultant, \vho inspected the plaintiff's
property several months after the alleged occurance, and
\\~ho said that he could find no evidence of gas damage
(T 203).
A perusal of the foregoing instruction reveals that
by giving Paragraph 1 thereof, the jury was lead to believe that damages \vas the principal question for determination, particularly in view of the following comment
by the court :

"I want you (the jury) to fix damages regardless
of \vhat your other ans\vers are, just for my information." ( T 239)
This charge was tantamount to a direction of the verdict,
as it \vithdre\v from the jury's consideration of defendant's alleged negligence, thus depriving defendant of
its constitutional right to have the jury detern1ine liability. Paragraph 1 of this instruction assumes that defenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dant was negligent. This prejudiced the determination
of an ultimate fact-negligence-by the jury. The general rule relating to instructions which detennine questions of fact is found in 88 C.J.S. 788, Trial 285, which
states:
"An instruction \vhich directly or impliedly determines an issuable question of fact is error and
is properly refused if requested. Thus, where
the question of negligence is one of fact, the rule
applies.''
1 Reids Branson, Instructions to Juries, 3rd Ed. 14:

"* * * The court n1ay not give instructions taking
the decisions of questions of fact from the jury
and neither may it speculate \vith the rights of
parties by submitting matters to the jury \vhere
no question of fact is involved * * *"
It is respectfully submitted that this instruction is
so patently defective that it cannot be cured by considering the instructions as a "~hole. The erroneous assmnption that the plaintiff's damage "Tas a result of the break
in defendant's line cannot be aided by other instructions
as it raises a conflict and is confusing to the jury. Any
instruction \vhich i:s pre-en1ptory in form and directs a
verdict, as this does, n1ust stand or fall on its own language and is not aided by other instructions. Boyer v.
Gen. Oil Products, l\Io. 78 S.W.2d ±50; Gigoux v. Henderson, 107 Kan. 325, 190 Pac. 1092; 53 Aln. Jur. 474,
Trial 601.
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(2uPstion :2- I~ of Instruction 6 is clearly leading,
suggestivP, and <·ontrary to the eviden('<~. The first part
of the question asked if the defendant's main line or
feeder line \vas negligently installed. To properly submit
this question to the jury there must be evidence in the
record tending to show that the lines were negligently
installed and that the defendant had installed or constructed them. The record is silent as to who installed
these lines. The only evidence in the record relating to
the installation of these lines is the testimony of Mr.
~[akin and ~Ir. Clark, both of ''Tho1n stated they did not
know \vho installed these lines ( T 12, 189). Both witnesses
also said that the break in the line \vas not due to faulty
construction or defective pipe ( T 29, 185). The plaintiff
did not offer any proof on this question. Thus, we have
a situation in \vhich an alleged act of specific negligence
was submitted to the jury without evidence having been
presented to support it. This type of instruction was
discussed by this court in the case of Olsen v. W arwood,
123 lTtah 111, 255 P.2d 725, \vherein the court stated:
"It is \Yell settled in this jurisdiction that an instruction must be based on evidence, and that it
is prejudicial error to submit a charged act of
negligence to a jur~T for its consideration in the
absence of evidence tending to support a finding
that the act occurred. Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah
116, 106 Pac. 653, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 953, and see
Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 10:2 Utah
563, 133 P .2d 333, 1±-l A.L.R. 1-±0:2 ~ Kendall v.
Fordham, 79 l:tah 256, 9 P. 2d 183. Like"rise it
is \\Tell settled that the court 1uay not permit the
jury to speculate upon the evidence and that a
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finding of fact cannot be based upon sur1nise,
conjecture, guess, or speculation. Jackson v. Colston, 116 lT tah 295, 209 P .2d 566; Dern Inv. Co.
v. Carbon County Land Co., 94 lTtah 76, 75 P.2d
660 * * *".
The second part of the special interrogatory, Question 2-B, implies that the defendant's gas lines were permitted to remain too near the surface, thereby subjecting
other to an unreasonable risk. The testimony shows
that the lines 'vere originally laid at a depth of three
feet ( T 33, 39). The plaintiff did not offer any evidence
to show that this \\Tas not a proper depth nor that any
depth was proper. Thus, there \Yas no standard in evidence which would guide the jury in determining \Vhat
a proper depth for natural gas lines. As noted previously,
a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, or speculation. The maintenance of a natural gas
line is not so cominon that the layn1an can express an
opinion as to \Yhat is reasonable care or a proper depth.
The jury cannot assu1ne that because the line \\~as broken the depth where it \\Tas fom1d \\'"as in1proper. Xegligence cannot be assun1ed fro1n an injury. Yet this is
the situation \vith \\'"hich the defendant \Yas faced w·hen
the court gave the special interrogatory, Question 2-B.
In returning an ans\\Ter of ··yes", the jury either found
that the line 'vas negligently installed without any evidence \vhatsoever relating to the installation, except as
to depth, or that it \vas 1naintained at an in1proper depth
in the absence of any Pvidence \\,.hatsoever as to \\'"hat was
a proper depth. Even if there ,,,.ere adequate evidence to
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support <"ith(•r (but not both) nnvroper installation or
tnaintenaiH'P, an in~truction lH'rmitting the jury to speculate is fatal.

For t hP foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully reqnPsts that tlt(• decision of the district court be
reversed and judgrnent be entered herein for the
defendant.

Respectfully submitted,
KASTLER & CRAWFORD
JOl-IN CRAWFORD, JR.
Attorneys for Appellant

180 East First South St.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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